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The dissolution of the sexual division of labour remains, in Hochschild’s (1989) 
words, a “stalled” revolution.  While more and more married women participate in paid 
work, men have not equalized the division of labour by appreciably increasing the time they 
devote to unpaid domestic tasks.   The state can assist in managing this double time burden 
on women by enabling families to externalize a portion of it via social provisions supporting 
maternal employment.  This paper presents a formal model of family time and resource 
distribution, women’s constraints therein, and the impact the market or social provisions can 
have in alleviating the strains between production and reproduction. The extent to which the 
externalization of the burden of care maintains both female labour force participation and 
family size is then analyzed for 11 countries in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s using data from 
the Luxembourg Income Study.  
 
1. MODELS OF FAMILY 
Economic models have increasingly been used to formalize family relationships ever 
since Gary Becker´s seminal work on the new home economics. His neoclassical frame limits 
the unit of analysis to the household, with each household maximizing a single utility 
function. Marriage occurs when the joint household output exceeds that of the component 
single-person households (Becker 1973, 1974); the sexual division of labour evolves because 
it is the most efficient means of increasing joint household production (Mincer & Polachek 
1974; Becker 1985); and fertility decisions are made by a dynastic head to optimize the 
number of children versus consumption across generations (Becker and Barro 1988).  
Individual needs within the household are satisfied via altruism, wherein decreased 
consumption of those with more resources is compensated for by their pleasure in increasing DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 3 
 
the consumption of other household members (Becker 1981). Altruism does not necessarily 
connote an equal sharing of resources, but assumes that individual short-falls are accepted as 
part of the cost of being a member of a family. This is a very strong assumption, requiring the 
existence of a universal preference for the traditional nuclear family comprised of a male 
breadwinner, female caregiver and their off-spring over all other alternatives.  The rise in 
married women’s employment and the rise in females choosing to be single heads of 
household suggest that more important dynamics are occurring within the household.   
Bargaining theory opens up the black box of the household by allowing for individual 
utility functions, with game theory applied to the intra-family distribution of goods and 
services. In a two-person game, as in a family, the outcomes of one person’s actions depend 
on the actions of the other player.  Nash bargaining models are used to determine family 
member strategies, initially applied with the assumption of cooperation among family 
members.  In a cooperative game, players communicate freely and make binding, costlessly 
enforceable agreements.  In these cooperative bargaining models, divorce has been 
considered the threat point (see, for example, Manser & Brown 1980 and McElroy & Horney 
1981).  
More recently, noncooperative game theory has been applied to the family.   
Noncooperative game theory relaxes the assumption that binding agreements are made, 
instead focusing on self-enforcing strategies that reflect best replies to the other partner’s best 
replies  (Lundberg & Pollak 1993; Lundberg & Pollak 1994).  Cooperation can be sustained 
even in a noncooperative game, however, if the game is repeated indefinitely. This requires a 
credible threat of punishment that reinforces the incentive to cooperate. Lundberg and Pollak 
(1994) theorise that the threat within the family, short of divorce or pernicious forms of DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 4 
 
abuse, is to reduce contributions to the family good.  Such a reduction could mean that 
couples live in less tidy homes.  Alternately, families could reduce the number of children.   
Presented next is a model of time and resource distribution representing key 
constraints on women’s choices between production and reproduction in a joint household.
 It 
is based on theoretical work with Richard Breen in which we are developing a full stylized 
model of family bargaining.  While the full bargaining model will depict the negotiable time 
allocations within a family, the constraint model presented here focuses on the family burden 
as assumed fully by the woman or shared with care providers external to the family. The 
reason for looking first at this constraint model is to ascertain whether female labour force 
participation and fertility levels can be maintained by outsourcing the burden of care, or 
whether the comparative evidence suggests that men must indeed assume more of the burden 
of care. 
 
2.   FAMILY TIME ALLOCATION 
In a joint household, women and men negotiate the production and distribution of 
private and family goods. The production of private goods entails labour force participation. 
An individual has control over those economic resources he or she directly generates and can 
distribute any portion, none to all, among other family members.  A pleasant home and well-
raised children are frequently referred to as family goods; however, allocating time to family 
goods production can be a matter of maximizing either individual or joint utility functions.  
Assume all individuals, i, have a total amount of time, T, available to be allocated to 
work, X, and leisure, L, 
(1) Ti = Xi + Li DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 5 
 
The choice of family state is budget constrained.  In the simplest family state of being single 
with no children, sc=0, time is allocated between work and leisure such that 
(2)  X(wi) > c(ai) 
Where wi is the wage rate of the individual and c(ai) is the consumption cost of maintaining 
an adult.  Total individual utility is comprised of the utility from production and the utility 
from reproduction (including leisure time).  In the single-no-children state this is, 
(3) sc=0  = U(X(wi)) + U (T-X-Y(a))wL) 
Y(a) is the time cost of maintaining one adult in terms of housekeeping, shopping, preparing 
meals, etc., whereas wL is the wage rate of leisure. 
  In a two-person family
2 with no children under the sexual division of labour, the total 
utility for a man in that state is, 
(4a) UM,mc=0 = U(X(wM) – c(aF)) + U((T-X) wL) + U(M) 
and for the female, 
(4b) UF,mc=0 = U(c(aF))  + U((T- Y(2a)) wL) + U(M). 
The male breadwinner in Equations 4a and 4b must cover the incremental economic 
cost associated with maintaining the wife, c(aF), but after meeting this, all of his remaining 
income can be devoted to meeting his own consumption needs and available time can be 
taken as leisure.  For the woman, the private consumption good is only that adult cost 
provided by the man.  Her time is devoted to the time cost of maintaining herself and the 
man, with any remaining time available for leisure. The utility of the union is depicted by 
U(M). 
                                                 
2 A two-person family comprised of an adult male and female is not the only family configuration possible.  
Since the interest here, however, is in differentiating between time allocations based on traditional gender roles, 
this assumption is necessary. DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 6 
 
The addition of children in this traditional male-breadwinner family increases the 
production burden of the man and the reproductive burden of the woman: 
(5a)  UM,m+c = U(X(wM) – c(aF) – c(c)) + U((T-X) wL) + U(M) + U(C) 
(5b)  UF,m+c = U(c(aW))  + U((T- Y(2a)-Y(c)) wL) + U(M) + U(C) 
where c(c) is the consumption cost of a child and Y(c) is the time cost of a child, and U(C) the 
utility derived from the child.  Men can meet their incremental family burden by working 
more hours, X, and reducing leisure time; garnering a higher wage rate, wM, or reducing the 
money allocated to covering the consumption costs of the woman or the child.  It is clear that 
if this latter tack were taken, women unable to participate in the labour market would have no 
choice to but accept the reduced c(aF) provided to them. Further, women’s time devoted to 
children cannot compensate for sub-optimal allocation to c(c).    
As a strategy to hedge against economic risk, then, the sexual division of labour 
appears quite inadequate. I contend that it did not evolve necessarily due to differing gender 
preferences for paid versus unpaid work such as claimed by Becker (1985); rather, the 
dominance of the male-breadwinner household evolved due to differing gender probabilities 
of success in the labour market.  Historically, women had few other economic options. In 
some industrialized countries, married women were specifically barred from employment 
(Lewis 1992) even during times when husbands were highly likely to be unemployed 
(Pedersen 1993). 
As women’s access to paid labour has improved, they can obtain greater economic 
independence.  This decreases their need to rely on a male breadwinner to hedge against 
economic destitution (see Breen 1998 for a formal presentation of this), in turn increasing the 
number of feasible household options.  First, women no longer need to marry for economic 
security.  It is even possible for women to have children without being married, either by DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 7 
 
choosing this state prior to childbearing or leaving a cohabitative state post-childbearing. 
Further, if women choose to form traditional households, their greater economic autonomy 
enhances their relative bargaining position within the family. In addition, as male labour 
force participation rates in OECD countries have fallen, women’s earnings provide a hedge 
against the rising risk of interruption in a male breadwinner’s earnings in even more 
traditional households.   
Thus, women’s paid labour force participation enhances both their individual 
bargaining power within the family and the family well-being, so it is a self-reinforcing 
strategy.  As a self-reinforcing strategy, it is likely to endure. Time, T, however, is 
constrained, so the optimal family allocation of time and resources to production versus 
reproduction becomes more complex as women devote more time to paid labour.  
Assume the man still does not assist appreciably in the time demands of the burden of 
care when women enter the labour market, an assumption supported by current empirical 
evidence (Blossfeld & Drobnic 2001; Coverman & Sheley 1986; Gershuny 2000). Under this 
scenario, men’s utility is identical to that displayed in Equation (5a).  What increase are the 
time and/or economic burdens within a working mother’s utility equation: 
 (6b)    UF,m+ce = U[(T-((Y(2a)+ Y(c) – Y(o))-L)( wF - wc,t)+ c(aF)]  +  
       U[(T- Y(2a)-Y(c)-X + Y(o)) wL) + U(M) + U(C) 
Y(o) is the time cost of family that is saved by either purchasing it in the market or having 
some portion of it covered by social provisions, and wc,t is the hourly cost of such assistance 
(wc if purchased in the market and wt derived as an hourly tax rate if care is made available as 
a social provision).  
  Over the past thirty years, real individual income has declined. Now, women need to 
participate in the labour force to maintain family wealth levels previously attainable by a DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 8 
 
male breadwinner.  Holding wealth constant, constraints represented in Equation 6b would 
predict that average family size should be lower in dual-earner versus single male-
breadwinner households.  In other words, if achieving a given level of wealth requires more 
time to be committed to production from both the man and the woman, there is less of the 
woman’s time available for family good production.  
The time strains on a dual-earner household can be ameliorated by either purchasing 
Y(o) from the market or having some of the burden alleviated by social provisions.  However, 
if women’s market participation is merely allowing the family to achieve the previous male-
breadwinner-only level of wealth, it may be too costly to purchase Y(o) from the market. 
When market solutions are the only available external resource to alleviate the time demands 
of 6b, the reduction in average family size within dual-earner households should be larger 
than in those countries with some social provisions for care. 
Social provisions can reduce a given family’s additional cost or time burdens of 
children via social provisions. Gornick and her colleagues (1997) constructed a relative index 
of social provisions supporting maternal employment for 14 industrialized countries.   The 
index includes policies as of mid-1980 on parental leave, childcare and scheduling of public 
education.
3  France, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Belgium had the most generous 
provisions for preschoolers, although relative support for infants versus children age 3 to 6 
varies. Norway, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Canada have more 
moderate support for maternal employment. Weakest social provisions for preschoolers were 
found in Australia, the UK and the US.   
Gornick, Meyers and Ross (1998) then simulate the likelihood that women exit the 
labour market when they have small children under these varying levels of support for 
                                                 
3 The indices are currently being updated, but results will not be available until later in 2001 or early 2002. DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 9 
 
maternal employment. They found that the existence of high child penalties in employment 
coincides with greater likelihood of female employment interruptions following childbearing.   
The child penalty for infants was greatest in the UK, followed in rank order by Australia, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, the US and Canada.  Italy alone yielded the only positive 
and significant coefficient, suggesting mothers with young children are actually more likely 
to remain employed.  Belgium, France and Sweden also had positive, albeit statistically 
insignificant, coefficients. 
An alternate avenue of agency available to women under varying support levels for 
maternal employment, however, is to reduce childbearing in favor of employment. The extent 
to which this avenue of gender agency is being taken will be assessed next for those 11 
countries where Gornick et al found the greatest and least child penalties. 
 
3. METHOD AND DATA 
The trade-off between family production and reproduction will be compared in 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the 
UK and the US using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).  LIS is an archive of 
microdata sets from 25 industrialized countries including demographic, labour market, and 
income data at the household and individual levels, rendered comparable across countries. 
Since the interest here is in ascertaining changes in fertility among joint households, a sample 
is selected of those married or cohabitating households where the woman is at risk for 
childbearing, defined as the female being less than 50 years old.
4   
                                                 
4 Analyses were also run using just legally married couples.  In those countries with more cohabitating couples, 
including them tended to slightly increase the prevalence of dual-earners among the lowest income quartiles.  
This is consistent with other evidence that suggests younger persons are more likely to cohabitate, in turn 
resulting in cohabitation being correlated with lower earnings earlier in the life course. DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 10 
 
As shown in Table 1, female employment has increased in all the countries between 
1985 and 1995.   Across this same time period, income inequality has also increased in all of 
these same countries with the exception of Canada (Smeeding 2000).  This suggests there are 
macroeconomic pressures on families, which are predicted in the model to increase the 
likelihood of women engaging in paid work in order to enhance family well-being. 
Consequently, two waves of LIS data will be used to compare changes in the prevalence of 
male-breadwinner versus dual-earner households, as well as family size, in mid-1980 versus 
mid-1990. 
If female labour force participation enhances both individual and family well-being, it 
should be increasing. As female labour force participation increases, fertility can be adversely 
affected because of the time constraints modeled in Equation 6(b).   To assess this, the 
dependent variable in the Models 1 and 2 for each time period will be the mean number of 
children under 18 in households.   
The first set of independent variables assess the predicted effects of household budget 
constraints controlling for women’s age.  Household financial circumstances are measured 
with three dummy variables for income quartiles based on disposable household income, less 
any family allowances: 
1.  Low Income, those households with disposable income greater than zero but at 




2.  Low Middle, those joint households with disposable income between the 25
th and 
50
th  percentile; 
 





                                                 
5 Many of the early surveys used to compile LIS use zero as a missing as well as valid value.  To avoid drawing 
conclusions based on missing observations, household income data was bottom coded to be greater than zero.  
Doing this changed the quartile cut-off values by less than 0.5 percent.   DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 11 
 
While some level of wealth is necessary to support a family, the highest income 
households have historically had smaller families.  Consequently, the high-income group 
(disposable income above the 75
th percentile) will be the referent against which the lower 
income groups are compared.  
The traditional pattern of female employment is to enter and exit the labour market 
depending upon family obligations.  As a result, both the youngest and oldest women in the 
age group of interest are more likely to be employed than women age 25 and 40, and also 
have fewer young children.  Younger women have not yet begun their families, so would 
have no children; older women are likely to have some children over the age 18. Three 
dummy variables will be included as controls for women’s age groups against a referent of 
women age 41 to 50.  The youngest age category includes females less than 25 years old, 
predicted to have significantly fewer children.  A second dummy denotes women age 25 to 
30.  These women should have more children than the youngest age group, but probably do 
not differ significantly from the referent. Women age 30 to 40 are predicted to have 
significantly more children under 18. 
A second model includes a dummy variable for a dual-earner household against a 
referent of a single male breadwinner. Being a dual-earner household is expected to predict 
lower average family size given the time pressures on women suggested in Equation 6(b).  
The extent to which a woman’s labour force participation is associated with fewer children is 
expected to vary across countries depending upon social policy support for maternal 
employment.  Being a dual-earner household is expected to have a larger negative impact on 
average family size in those countries with the highest child penalty for young children: the 
UK, Australia, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, the US and Canada. If social provisions 
enable women to balance production and reproduction, ceteris paribus, the dual-earner effect DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 12 
 
on number of children should be smaller and insignificant in Italy, Belgium, France and 
Sweden, those countries with the lowest child penalties.  
The hypothesized dual-earner effect may reflect women’s preferences for production 
versus reproduction.  Women’s presumed preference for unpaid care work (Becker 1981) was 
postulated at a time when women’s access to the labour market was more restricted.  Now 
that more women have greater access to employment, those that prefer production over 
reproduction might choose to have fewer children in favor of employment.  In this case, even 
the most generous social provisions will not ameliorate the dual-earner effect, and increases 
in the magnitude of the effect across time may be revealing a growing portion of women with 
greater preference for production versus reproduction.  
A logistical regression will also be run to ascertain the characteristics of women likely 
to be second earners in a household at the two time periods for each country.  Predictors 
include variables for women’s age, educational attainment, ethnicity of the household head, 
and number of children.  It is important to control for number of children because of the 
inability to assess causality with cross-sectional data.  While in the prior analysis, it is 
assumed that female employment may result in fewer children, it is equally plausible that 
having more children makes it more difficult for women to be employed.  Thus, the effect of 
each additional child on the likelihood of a woman being employed is expected to follow the 
same patterns as dual-earner effects in the prior analysis.    
As in the previous regression, age effects will be modeled with three dummy variables 
for younger women relative to those in the 41 to 50 year old group, the age at which women 
are most likely to be working since any children they have are older.  It is predicted that the 
youngest age group is more likely to be employed than either women in their late 20s or 30s, 
the prime childbearing and child-rearing years.  DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 13 
 
For the likelihood model, the effects of income group will be assessed differently than 
in the prior regression models.  As noted earlier, lower-income women have always been the 
most likely to be employed, making this category a stable referent across time.  In contrast, 
there are divergent predictions as to the likelihood of employment among women in the 
highest income group.  Women among the highest income quartile are the ones in households 
with the least economic need for the additional resources of their employment.  This would 
lead to a prediction that such women are less likely to be secondary earners.  On the other 
hand, researchers in the US have found that the rising correlation of wives’ and husbands’ 
earnings is contributing to rising income inequality (Cancian, Danziger & Gottschalk 1993), 
especially among more highly-skilled women (Chiun & Murphy 1996).  This would suggest 
that women in the highest income groups might be more likely to be employed and causing 
the family to be in the highest quartile.  Consequently, I wanted to see how the highest 
income group effects manifest in the countries. 
Dummy variables are constructed at the two extremes of women’s educational 
attainment: one for women attaining primary school or less, and one for schooling beyond 
secondary level,
6 against a referent of secondary schooling.  Predicted effects of education on 
the likelihood of partnered women being employed are also divergent along the same lines as 
income. In neoclassical economic models, women’s preference for employment is associated 
with higher educational attainment, in that women will choose greater human capital 
investment in expectation of its returns in the labour market (Nerlove 1973), much as was 
reported above for the 1980s among US women.  The human capital model would also 
predict that once controlling for being in lower-income households, lower-educated women 
will be less likely to comprise dual-earner households, as their low stock of human capital DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 14 
 
would yield the smallest returns. On the other hand, using a rational choice model, Breen and 
Goldthorpe (1997) suggest that women traditionally pursued post-secondary education as a 
strategy for finding a better partner, not an investment in human capital.  This would lead to 
the prediction that more highly educated women are less likely to be second earners in a 
household.  An interaction term will also be constructed for highly educated, high-income 
women to determine the likelihood of employment among these most advantaged women 
across countries and time. 
Finally, different ethnic groups have varying traditions regarding desired family size 
and maternal employment that might diverge from other family and female employment 
trends within countries.  Where this information is available in the LIS data archive, it will be 
entered as control dummies (see Table 6 for countries, categories and referents). 
 
4.  RESULTS 
A.  Dual-Earner Effect on Average Family Size 
  Across the countries, the proportion of male-breadwinner households continues to 
decline, from an average of 33 percent in mid-1980 to 20 percent in mid-1990 (see Table 2).  
The relative proportion of each household type within the four income groups has remained 
stable, with dual-earner households on average economically better-off than male-
breadwinner households.  Over two-thirds of all dual-earner households have income above 
the 50
th percentile, whereas approximately the same proportion of male-breadwinner 
households have income below the 50
th percentile. 
  As shown in Table 3, the mean number of children under 18 before controlling for 
other factors is lower in dual-earner households except in Norway 1986, with the difference 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The analyses were also run using attainment of the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree, which did not DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 15 
 
generally being statistically significant.
7  Trends across time vary.  The average number of 
children has declined in both household types in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and the UK.  The average number of children has remained the same or increased in both 
household types in Belgium, Germany and the US.  In Italy and Norway, average family size 
has increased in male-breadwinner households yet fallen further in dual-earner households. 
  Results of the regression are displayed in Table 4.  In most countries, being a lower-
income household predicts more children versus the highest income households.  This was 
true for all three lower quartiles at both times in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK.  It was true for the lower three quartiles in mid-1980 in Canada, Italy and the US, but by 
mid-1990, only those households in these countries with income at the 50
th percentile or 
below had significantly more children under 18 than the highest income quartile.  In France 
and Sweden, this 50
th percentile split was true in both mid-1980 and mid-1990.  Only in 
Belgium was the difference in average number of children generally insignificant among the 
income groups. 
  The age coefficients reveal fairly consistent trends in timing of children across 
countries. In the mid-1980s, being a woman less than 25 years of age predicted significantly 
fewer children in all countries but Belgium and France.   This coefficient was negative in all 
the countries in mid-1990, although the result was not statistically significant in Belgium.   
For most countries, however, the coefficients were positive and significant for women age 25 
to 30 and women age 30 to 40, with the latter being the largest.  The exceptions were the 
Netherlands, where the coefficient for the 25-30 age group was insignificant, and Australia, 
                                                                                                                                                        
substantively alter results reported. 
7 While the difference failed to reach statistical significance for France 1994, this could be due to the fact that 
the number of male-breadwinner households relative to dual-earner households was very small. This also 
eliminated the reference category in the regression for dual-earner households. DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 16 
 
where the coefficient for the 25-30 age group was insignificant in mid-1980 and negative in 
mid.1990.    
Yet in those countries where the coefficient for the 25-30 age group was positive and 
significant across time periods, it tended to be much smaller in mid-1990 than mid-1980 
(with changes ranging between -.11 and -.79), except in Italy, the Netherlands and the US 
where it remained almost identical, and Sweden, where it was only slightly smaller.  At the 
same time, the size of the coefficient for the 30 to 40 year age group stayed more equal across 
the two time periods.  These results suggest that on average, women are delaying 
childbearing until later in the life course.  Data for future time periods are needed to ascertain 
whether the overall level of family size is remaining constant, or if the youngest cohort 
analyzed here will have fewer children when they reach the prime family-size age group of 
30 to 40. 
As predicted, the dual-earner effect tended to be more negative in those countries with 
higher child penalties, although the relative order differed from Gornick et al’s results for 
mid-1980s.  The notable exception was France, with the most negative dual-earner effect for 
mid-1980s.  A working French woman was predicted to have -.62 children less after 
controlling for the other variables.  This was followed by Canada, the UK, Germany, Norway 
and the US with coefficients between -.57 and -.50.  More moderate, but still negative dual-
earner effects were found in Australia, Sweden and Belgium, and no statistically significant 
effect was found in Italy. 
For mid-1990, the absolute rankings shifted only slightly, but trends within countries 
varied.  Once cases were excluded for missing income data, an insufficient number of male 
breadwinner households remained for a comparison group in France, so there is no way to 
ascertain if the negative dual-earner effect in that country was maintained.  The dual-earner DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 17 
 
effect became more negative in the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy, with changes in 
coefficient size between -.11 and -.12.   The coefficient was slightly more negative in 
Belgium and Germany. The dual-earner effect eased slightly in Australia, Norway and the 
US, and somewhat more in Canada and Sweden.  These within-country trends of the dual-
earner effect did not coincide with relative increases in the number of dual-earning 
households.  For example, while the change in the dual-earner effect was the same in the 
Netherlands and Italy (-.12), the Netherlands experienced an increase of 11 percentage points 
in the number of dual-earning households while the increase in Italy was just one percentage 
point. 
Not included in the regression because of its endogeneity is the impact family 
allowances may have on average family size.   Table 5 presents mean family allowances and 
maternity benefits for the countries in US dollar equivalents at the time and the proportion of 
mean household income family allowances represented.  These data suggest that, while 
family allowances may ameliorate part of the cost burden of children, variances in their 
generosity and changes in their relative generosity over time do not necessarily support 
maternal employment, and do not coincide with the relative sizes of the dual-earner effect.  
Nor do the more generous allowances coincide with larger average family size.  The US, with 
no family allowances, has on average more children per household than Sweden with the 
most generous allowance.   
 
B.  Likelihood of Being in a Dual-Earner Household 
Table 6 reveals that women in the lowest income quartile have the greatest likelihood 
of being in a dual-earning household and that the likelihood declines as economic status 
increases.  This supports that the decision for partnered women to work is economically DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 18 
 
motivated.  The evidence presented here does not support the human capital model at either 
end of the educational attainment scale.  Even after controlling for income, the least educated 
women are far more likely to be employed than those women completing secondary 
education despite their lower accrued human capital.  In addition, where results are 
statistically significant, the most highly educated women are less likely to be employed 
except in Italy in mid-1980.   
The interaction term between high education and high income was statistically 
significant in the US in mid-1980, supporting the results found elsewhere and indicating that 
these women were far more likely to be employed.    This is the exception for the countries, 
however, and not the norm.  In the same time period, the direction of the effect was the same 
in Australia and Canada, but the coefficients were not statistically significant.  For the 
remaining countries, these privileged women were less likely to be employed in the mid-
1980s, less likely in general than when just looking at high education alone. 
As of mid-1990, even the situation in the US had changed, with the coefficient for 
highly educated, high income women smaller than it was in mid-1980, and now statistically 
insignificant despite a much larger sample size.  This same group of women in Australia, 
Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands is also slightly more likely to be employed in mid-1990s, 
but the coefficients are not statistically significant.  In Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden 
and the UK, these women were less likely to be employed, although in most cases the 
difference was again not statistically significant.  These results support that women’s pursuit 
of post-secondary education is not necessarily a strategy for enhancing human capital, but 
predicts a greater likelihood of adhering to the sexual division of labour.   
This conclusion is also supported by the results for the youngest partnered women.  
The traditional pattern of female employment has been that young women work for a period DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 19 
 
of time before marriage, and then exit the labour market at either marriage or childbirth, and 
then return later in the life course after their family obligations have eased.  As shown in 
Table 6, these youngest women are significantly less likely than women age 41 to 50 to be 
employed in all countries except the UK, and in many cases less likely than any other age 
group.  It could be that these women have started their families by the age of 25, or these 
women may still be in education and move from that state directly to motherhood.  
 
4.    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The dissolution of the sexual division of labour within households appears to have 
stalled as of the mid-1990s for both men and women.  While more women are participating 
in the labour market, the motivation appears to be to enhance family economic well-being 
among the lower income quartiles.  As women allocate more time to production and men still 
restrict their time devoted to care work, the average family size can be expected to decline 
unless the burden of care can be assumed outside the family by the market or via social 
provisions.   
The findings here suggest that being a dual-earner household in the mid-1990s 
predicts fewer children in all the countries studied, although the trends within countries 
across time vary. As of the mid-1990s, the negative dual-earner effect is the smallest in 
Belgium, Sweden and Italy, countries with more generous social provisions in support of 
maternal employment. It is most acute in the UK, followed in rank order by Germany, the 
Netherlands, the US, Norway, Canada and Australia, countries with fewer or no provisions 
supporting maternal employment.    
The fact that the negative effect of being a dual-earner household is smaller in those 
countries with the most generous provisions supports that welfare regimes can underwrite the DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 20 
 
burden of care in order to maintain average family size as well as the additional tax base 
stemming from maternal employment.  Leaving the burden of care to the market does not 
appear to alleviate time and economic pressures that result in smaller average family size.     
But it is not clear that additional social provisions would eliminate the dual-earner 
penalty completely for two reasons.   First, the smaller family sizes may be reflecting 
women’s true preferences for production versus reproduction. Women’s presumed preference 
for unpaid care work was postulated at a time when women’s access to the labour market was 
more restricted.  Even now, women encounter wage differentials and family wage gaps that 
tip relative family resources in favor of women assuming more of these unpaid burdens.  
Research with panel data is needed in this area, to determine to what extent the smaller 
family sizes when women choose to work reflect true preferences for production versus 
reproduction, or the hypothesized economic and time constraints.   
Second, while the evidence suggests that externalizing some of the burden of care 
eases the time and economic pressures on women, it may be that additional relief can only 
come from within the household.  Further research is needed to ascertain whether average 
family sizes are larger in those households where men devote more time to caregiving and 
household tasks relative to similar households where the burden of care is managed by the 
woman or outsourced to external providers. 
One intriguing finding is that the most educated and economically privileged women 
who could garner the greatest individual market rewards are less likely to be employed, more 
likely instead to choose the traditional sexual division of labour.  This result casts doubt on 
whether women wish to achieve economic autonomy or equality, instead suggesting that the 
interplay between personal and family strategies is more complex.  At the same time, while DRAFT- As of 06/20/01     Page 21 
 
these high-income households have the greatest time and economic resources, the average 
family size of this group still tends to be the smallest.   
In sum, for most families, female employment is an economic necessity, but one with 
a reproductive cost that is not fully ameliorated by social provisions.  The extent to which this 
reflects changing women’s preferences, or the extent to which men’s assumption of more of 
the burden of care can reverse this trend are still unknown.  In addition, highly educated 
women are less, rather than more, likely to eschew the traditional sexual division of labour, 
but neither do they pursue greater levels of reproduction.  It is clear we must move beyond 
existing household models of family or individual models of gender to explain family and 
gender strategies in the modern world.     
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-TABLE 1- 
Female & Married Woman Labour Force Participation Rates 
Selected Countries 
1965, 1985, 1995 
 
    %  Female Labour Force             % Married Women Working 
         1965      1985  1995     1965      1985        1995   
Australia  29 %  38 %  43 %  -  41 %  - 
Belgium 31  38  42  -  -  - 
Canada 30  42  45  -  -  57 
France 35  41  44 -  -  - 
Germany  37  40 43  34 -  46 
Italy 29  33  35  -  31  32 
The Netherlands  -  34  41  -  -  37 
Norway 30  44  47  -  66  80 
Sweden  37  47 48  42 66 68 
United Kingdom  35  42  45  -  -  - 
United  States  35  44 46  33 47 52 
 
Source:  OECD Statistical Compendium 02-2000 
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-TABLE 3- 
Average Number of Children Under 18  
Male-Breadwinner v. Dual-Earner Households 
Mid-1980 and Mid-1990 
 
             Male      Dual- 
    Breadwinner   Earner t-statistic 
                                                                  (N)                          (N)         
Australia 1985  1.88  1.36    9.97   
 (822)  (1204)   
Australia 1994  1.76  1.20   10.42 
 (683)  (1621) 
Belgium 1985  1.20  1.05    3.56 
 (1081)  (1795) 
Belgium 1996  1.40  1.13    3.99 
 (348)  (1188) 
Canada 1987  1.89  1.28   11.46 
 (516)  (3579) 
Canada 1997  1.64  1.17   17.59 
 (2156)  (10012) 
France 1984  1.77  1.09   21.32 
 (1753)  (3426) 
France 1994  1.44  1.30       .97 
 (60)  (4002) 
Germany 1984  1.45    .86   27.52 
 (3262)  (4365) 
Germany 1994  1.59    .92   34.04 
 (4190)  (7478)   
Italy 1986  1.30  1.26    2.06 
 (5657)  (3647) 
Italy 1995  1.32  1.13    5.66 
 (1491)  (1728) 
The Netherlands 1987  1.60    .82   15.82 
 (1184)  (751) 
The Netherlands 1994  1.57    .80   15.29 
 (899)  (983) 
Norway 1986  1.52  1.53      .10 
 (1385)  (148) 
Norway 1995  1.75  1.28    8.54 
 (491)  (2242) 
Sweden 1987  1.70  1.24    4.14 
 (104)  (1000) 
Sweden 1995  1.52  1.09    3.07 
 (296)  (3032) 
UK 1986  1.85  1.16   14.93 
 (839)  (1896) 
UK 1995  1.84  1.06   24.72 
 (1623)  (6141) 
US 1986  1.78  1.22   37.28 
 (8255)  (26,047) 
US 1997  1.78  1.27   23.45 




(Separate file:  Table4DE_Age  - 6 pages) 
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-TABLE 5- 
Mean Family Allowances and Maternity Benefits by Country 
(amounts are in 2000 US dollar equivalents) 
 
 
  Family Allowance  Maternity   HH Income    Allowance  DE 
  Mean SD  Mean  SD Mean  SD %  DPIF  Effect (b) 
Australia 1985     $       587    $    547    $       -      $     -      $     26,861   $   10,514  2.19% -0.37
Australia 1994   $       741    $  1,382    $       -      $     -      $     31,102   $   18,713  2.38% -0.33
Belgium 1985   $    1,480    $  1,653    $       -      $     -      $     16,205   $     7,859  9.13% -0.28
Belgium 1996   $    2,978    $  3,129    $       -      $     -      $     39,440   $   22,546  7.55% -0.32
Canada 1987   $       625    $    596    $       -      $     -      $     42,097   $   22,024  1.48% -0.57
Canada 1997   $       711    $  1,140    $       -      $     -      $     37,590   $   22,177  1.89% -0.43
France 1984   $    1,463    $  2,526    $       -      $     -      $     24,100   $   14,368  6.07% -0.62
France 1994   $    1,802    $  2,495    $      93    $   744    $     38,368   $   24,840  4.94% na
Germany 1984   $       772    $    979    $      33    $   297    $     26,382   $   13,211  3.05% -0.54
Germany 1994   $    1,002    $    385    $     385    $1,344    $     38,704   $   25,708  3.58% -0.58
Italy 1986 (000)   $         -      $       -      $       -      $     -      $     23,703   $   18,031  0.00% ns
Italy 1995 (000)   $         -      $       -      $       -      $     -      $     26,418   $   19,934  0.00% -0.15
Netherlands 1987   $    1,367    $  1,420    $       -      $     -      $     26,794   $   12,468  5.10% -0.46
Netherlands 1994   $    1,522    $  1,636    $       -      $     -      $     31,785   $   14,884  4.79% -0.58
Norway 1986   $    1,720    $  1,392    $       -      $     -      $     44,995   $   21,393  3.82% -0.51
Norway 1995    $    3,114    $  2,754    $      75    $   589    $     53,976   $   38,269  5.91% -0.47
Sweden 1987   $    1,719    $  1,722    $  1,458    $3,523    $     32,598   $   16,406  9.75% -0.35
Sweden 1995   $    1,784    $  1,749    $  2,301    $4,824    $     37,307   $   15,976  10.95% -0.20
UK 1986   $    1,111    $    973    $     149    $   693    $     23,667   $   14,229  5.32% -0.55
UK 1995   $    1,064    $    994    $      69    $   843    $     34,998   $   26,343  3.24% -0.66
US 1986   $         -      $       -      $       -      $     -      $     47,371   $   27,164  0.00% -0.50
US 1997   $         -      $       -      $       -      $     -      $     54,087   $   42,546  0.00% -0.48
 
 
•  Disposable income less family allowances and maternity benefit, all partnered households 
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-TABLE 6- 
Log-Likelihood of Female Being in Dual-Earner Household 
 
mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90
N 2938 2339 2876 1654 4934 12388 2106 2421 3754 3156
Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B)
Low-Mid 1.25 0.92 0.29 0.28 0.70 0.44 0.43 0.31 0.61 0.72
Mid-High 0.46 0.37 0.07 0.08 0.45 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.11 0.18
High Income 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.08
Female LT25 1.08 0.80 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.73 0.25 0.92 0.43 0.82
Female 2530 1.41 1.17 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.60 0.59 0.72 0.28 0.62
Female 3040 0.79 1.03 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.67 0.46 0.61 0.38 0.58
Low Ed 1.42 2.15 1.36 1.59 1.54 2.02 1.07 0.88 1.14 2.76
High Ed 1.05 1.32 0.78 0.47 0.59 0.93 0.45 0.61 1.58 0.22
HiEd*HiIncome 1.07 1.15 0.35 1.15 1.02 0.69 0.25 0.85 0.82 1.40
Ethnic 1.07 0.89 1.02 0.90 1.18 0.83 1.04 1.83 na na
# Children 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.61 0.67 0.48 0.51 0.96 0.80
Overall Predict 69% 74% 77% 81% 87% 82% 67% 72% 73% 74%
mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90
N 1687 1941 1956 3624 3901 4658 2687 2373 4445 17570
Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B)
Low-Mid 0.33 0.58 0.31 0.10 0.54 0.63 0.50 0.47 0.57 0.37
Mid-High 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.03 0.13 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.44 0.25
High Income 0.04 0.05 0.47 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.23
Female LT25 0.12 0.13 0.48 1.07 0.80 0.75 1.35 1.72 0.56 0.61
Female 2530 0.27 0.26 0.52 0.85 0.56 0.47 1.38 1.74 0.64 0.69
Female 3040 0.33 0.68 0.66 0.81 0.72 0.54 0.95 1.37 0.67 0.84
Low Ed 1.17 1.26 0.92 1.10 na 2.39 1.17 5.88 1.91 1.58
High Ed 0.69 0.59 0.52 0.82 na 0.77 0.93 0.86 0.74 0.78
HiEd*HiIncome 0.61 1.13 0.68 0.51 na 0.53 0.91 0.68 1.43 1.15
B l a c k n an an an a n an a n an a 0.54 0.60
Hispanic na na na na na na na na 0.98 1.18
# Children 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.69 0.81 0.61 0.59 0.70 0.71
Overall Predict 77% 75% 95% 87% 91% 91% 74% 81% 77% 80%
Italy
Netherlands Norway Sweden UK US
Australia Belgium Canada Germany
 
                                                  Numbers in BOLD statistically significant at p< .05 
 
Ethnic Dummy and Referents: 
Australia 1980s  Anglo (Australian or UK) v. all other nationalities 
Australia 1990s  Australian v. all other nationalities 
Belgium 1980s  Wallon v. Flanders or Brussels domicile 
Belgium 1990s  Wallon v. Flanders or Brussels domicile 
Canada 1980s  Canadian-born v. immigrants 
Canada 1990s  English-speaking Canadian-born v. French-speaking and others 
Germany 1980s  German-born v. others 
Germany 1990s  West German nationals v. others, including East Germans 
US 1980s  Two dummies: one for Black, one for Hispanic v. others 
US 1990s  Two dummies: one for Black, one for Hispanic v. others -TABLE 2- 
Male Breadwinner versus Dual-Earner Proportion of Households by Income Quartile 




mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90 mid80 mid90
Australia 14% 19% 7% 8% 44% 39% 18% 19% 28% 27% 34% 34% 14% 16% 42% 40%
Belgium 30% 34% 5% 7% 36% 33% 20% 24% 18% 16% 36% 38% 17% 18% 39% 31%
Canada 30% 38% 18% 13% 33% 31% 26% 24% 24% 20% 29% 31% 0% 12% 28% 32%
France 32% 34% 16% 18% 34% 34% 22% 25% 17% 19% 29% 29% 14% 14% 29% 28%
Germany 23% 29% 19% 7% 32% 28% 25% 20% 24% 18% 28% 32% 20% 21% 29% 34%
Italy 26% 37% 5% 12% 34% 36% 11% 17% 23% 18% 39% 35% 17% 8% 46% 37%
Netherlands 23% 14% 3% 4% 36% 42% 12% 12% 23% 28% 37% 38% 18% 16% 48% 46%
Norway 14% 47% 12% 4% 28% 31% 27% 23% 31% 13% 31% 37% 27% 8% 30% 36%
Sweden 40% 36% 12% 15% 38% 34% 21% 21% 14% 22% 32% 31% 8% 8% 35% 33%
UK 32% 31% 12% 11% 29% 29% 22% 22% 21% 20% 31% 32% 18% 20% 35% 36%
US 31% 39% 16% 15% 27% 25% 26% 26% 23% 19% 30% 31% 18% 17% 29% 28%
 Average 27% 32% 11% 10% 34% 33% 21% 21% 22% 20% 32% 33% 15% 14% 35% 35%
Low Income Low-Middle High-Middle High Income






Income quartiles based on all married households 
Proportions based on relative percentage within household type -TABLE 4- 
OLS Country Results: Average Number of Children Under 18  
1980s v. 1990s 
***p<.000   **  p<.01   *    p<.05                06/20/01 
AUSTRALIA 
     
         1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1                 1990s Model 2                 
             (N=2023)                            (N=2023)                                                (N=2286)                                  (N=2286)  
















=.23    
                                                                      SE=1.04    F=90.92 ***
(6,2016 )             SE=1.03   F=87.74***
(7,2015)                             SE=1.06   F=104.87***
(6,2279)               SE=1.05   F=97.37***
(7,2278)  
                                                      b                  SE  b                   SE                      b                 SE                          b             SE  
  Constant    .94***  .05    1.24***  .07    .80***  .04    1.09***  .06 
  Low income quartile    .75*** .09    .60*** .09    .71*** .08    .59***  .08 
  Low-mid income quartile    .70*** .06    .53*** .07    .59*** .06    .48***  .06 
  Mid-high income quartile     .38*** .06    .31*** .06    .28*** .06    .24***  .06 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .72***  .10  -  .70***  .09  -  .69***  .10  -  .67***  .10 
  Female 25 to 30 years   -  .09  .07  -  .11  .07  -  .21**  .07  -  .22**  .07 
  Female 30 to 40 years     .74***  .06    .74***  .06    .79***  .05    .77***  .05 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years          -  .37***  .05          -  .33***  .05 




         1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1               1990s Model 2                 
             (N=2876)                            (N=2876)                                                (N=1536)                               (N=1536)  
                                                  R
2
=.20  , Adj. R
2
=. 201              R
2
=.21 , Adj. R
2
=.21                                             R
2
=.21 , Adj. R
2




=.21    
                                                                         SE=.95    F=121.42 ***
(6,2869 )           SE=.94   F=111.68***
(7,2868)                                 SE=1.00   F=65.68***
(6,1529)             SE=.99   F=60.32***
(7,1528)  
                                                      b                  SE  b                   SE                      b                 SE                          b             SE  
 Constant   .38***  .04       .56***  .05   .74***  .06   .98***  .06 
  Low income quartile    .19***  .06   .02  .06   .13  .09  -  .03  .09 
  Low-mid  income  quartile    .07 .05  -  .03 .05  -  .06 .07  -  .12  .07 
  Mid-high  income  quartile    - .07  .05  - .09*  .05  - .09  .07  - .09  .07 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25     .21**  .07    .33***  .07  -  .33**  .12  -  .22  .12 
  Female 25 to 30 years    1.04***  .05    1.14***  .05    .27***  .07    .35***  .07 
  Female 30 to 40 years    1.04***  .05    1.08***  .05    1.05***  .06    1.09***  .06 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years             
 Dual-Earner  (v.  Male  Breadwinner)        -  .28***  .04        -  .32***  .07 
 
      -TABLE 4- 
OLS Country Results: Average Number of Children Under 18  
1980s v. 1990s 
***p<.000   **  p<.01   *    p<.05                06/20/01 
CANADA 
    
          1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1                  1990s Model 2                 
             (N=4086)                            (N=4086)                                               (N=12151)                               (N=12151)  
                                                  R
2
=.15  , Adj. R
2
=. 15              R
2
=.17 , Adj. R
2
=.17                                              R
2
=.13 , Adj. R
2




=.15    
                                                                         SE=1.07    F=118.09 ***
(6,4079 )           SE=1.05  F=121.93***
(7,4078)                        SE=1.05   F=302.25***
(6,12144)               SE=1.03 F=305.86***
(7,12143)  
                                                      b                  SE  b                   SE                      b                 SE                          b             SE  
  Constant    .79***  .04    1.28***  .06    .82***  .02    1.22***  .03   
  Low income quartile    .37***  .05   .26***  .05   .08**  .03   .08**  .03 
  Low-mid income quartile    .32***  .05   .24***  .05   .08**  .03   .08**  .03 
 Mid-high  income  quartile     .14**  .05   .11*  .05   .04  .03   .04  .03 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .52***  .07  -  .40***  .07  -  .43***  .04  -  .43***  .04 
  Female 25 to 30 years     .29***  .05    .37***  .05    .20***  .03    .20***  .03 
  Female 30 to 40 years     .83***  .04    .87***  .04    .78***  .02    .78***  .02 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years             
 Dual-Earner  (v.  Male  Breadwinner)        -  .57***  .05        -  .43***  .03 
  
FRANCE 
     
         1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1                                
             (N=4900)                            (N=4900)                                                (N=4062)  
                                                R
2
=.20  , Adj. R
2
=. 20              R
2
=.23 , Adj. R
2
=.23                                             R
2
=.21 , Adj. R
2
=.20   
                                                                      SE=1.02    F=206.77 ***
(6,4893)           SE=1.00   F=207.06***
(7,4892)                                 SE=.99   F=174.40***
(6,4055)             
  
                                                      b                  SE  b                   SE                      b                 SE  
  Constant    .49***  .04    1.05***  .06      .77***  .04 
  Low income quartile    .48*** .04    .35*** .05    .20*** .05 
  Low-mid income quartile    .37*** .04    .30*** .04    .11**  .04 
  Mid-high income quartile     .01  .04    .01  .04  -  .02  .04 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .01  .05    .03  .05  -  .39***  .07 
  Female 25 to 30 years     .84***  .04    .88***  .04    .33***  .04 
  Female 30 to 40 years     1.11***  .04    1.15***  .04    1.05***  .04 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years             
  Dual-Earner (v. Male Breadwinner)          -  .62***  .05 
 
 -TABLE 4- 
OLS Country Results: Average Number of Children Under 18  
1980s v. 1990s 
***p<.000   **  p<.01   *    p<.05                06/20/01 
GERMANY 
    
           1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1                 1990s Model 2                 
             (N=7627)                            (N=7627)                                               (N=10960)                               (N=10960)  
                                               R
2
=.17  , Adj. R
2
=. 17              R
2
=.24 , Adj. R
2
=.24                                              R
2
=.20 , Adj. R
2




=.26    
                                                                       SE=.89    F=261.24 ***
(6,7620 )             SE=.86   F=335.18***
(7,7619)                                SE=.95  F=462.73***
(6,10953)                SE=.92   F=559.26***
(7,10952)  
                                                      b                  SE  b                   SE                      b                 SE                          b             SE  
 Constant   .61***  .02   .98***  .03       .60***  .02      1.04***  .03 
  Low income quartile    .42*** .03    .16*** .03    .54*** .03    .28***  .03 
  Low-mid income quartile    .22***  .03   .07**  .03   .38***  .03   .27***  .03 
  Mid-high income quartile     .04  .03  -  .02  .03  -  .03  .02  -  .02  .02 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .38***  .05  -  .20***  .05  -  .44***  .05  -  .40***  .05 
  Female 25 to 30 years     .46***  .03    .48***  .03    .15***  .03    .17***  .03 
  Female 30 to 40 years     .78***  .02    .80***  .02    .88***  .02    .87***  .02 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years             
 Dual-Earner  (v.  Male  Breadwinner)          -  .54***  .02        -  .58***  .02 
 
ITALY 
    
           1980s Model 1      1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1               1990s Model 2                 
                (N=9305)                              (N=9305)                                             (N=3182)                               (N=3182)  
                                                  R
2
=.16  , Adj. R
2
=. 16                  R
2
=.16 , Adj. R
2
=.16                                             R
2
=.17 , Adj. R
2




=.18    
                                                                         SE=.87    F=301.58 ***
(6,9298 )             SE=.87   F=258.86***
(7,9297)                           SE=.88   F=111.14***
(6,3175)                 SE=.88     F=98.09***
(7,3174) 
                                                      b                  SE  b                   SE                      b                 SE                          b             SE  
 Constant   .69***  .02   .71***  .02   .68***  .04       .79***  .05 
  Low income quartile    .34*** .03    .32*** .03    .30*** .05    .22***  .05 
  Low-mid income quartile    .34*** .03    .32*** .03    .15*** .05    .08  .05 
  Mid-high income quartile     .19*** .02    .18*** .02    .01  .04  -  .02  .04 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .21***  .04  -  .21***  .04  -  .16  .10  -  .15  .10 
  Female 25 to 30 years     .34***  .03    .35***  .03    .34***  .05    .36***  .05 
  Female 30 to 40 years     .78***  .02    .79***  .02    .84***  .04    .85***  .04 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years                 
 Dual-Earner  (v.  Male  Breadwinner)        -  .03  .02        -  .15***  .04   
 
 -TABLE 4- 
OLS Country Results: Average Number of Children Under 18  
1980s v. 1990s 
***p<.000   **  p<.01   *    p<.05                06/20/01 
THE NETHERLANDS 
           
         1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1                 1990s Model 2                 
             (N=1929)                            (N=1929)                                                (N=1879)                                  (N=1879)  
                                              R
2
=.29  , Adj. R
2
=. 29              R
2
=.32 , Adj. R
2
=.32                                              R
2
=.25 , Adj. R
2




=.29    
                                                                         SE=.94    F=132.30 ***
(6,1922 )           SE=.92   F=129.70***
(7,1921)                             SE=1.00   F=103.54***
(6,1872)               SE=.97   F=112.08***
(7,1871)  
                                                      b                  SE  b                   SE                      b                 SE                          b             SE  
 Constant   .63***  .05   .86***  .06       .66***  .06      1.03***  .06 
  Low income quartile    .86*** .07    .59*** .07    .62*** .09    .25** .10 
  Low-mid income quartile    .76*** .06    .54*** .06    .52*** .06    .19** .07 
 Mid-high  income  quartile     .35***  .06   .27***  .06   .27***  .06   .15**  .06 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .86***  .09  -  .65***  .09  -  .85***  .09  -  .58***  .09 
  Female 25 to 30 years   -  .11  .06    .01  .06  -  .10  .07    .06  .06 
  Female 30 to 40 years     .76***  .06    .82***  .06    .85***  .06    .91***  .06 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years             
 Dual-Earner  (v.  Male  Breadwinner)        -  .46***  .05        -  .58***  .05 
 
NORWAY 
    
           1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1               1990s Model 2                 
             (N=1533)                            (N=1533)                                                (N=2732)                               (N=2732)  
                                                  R
2
=.21  , Adj. R
2
=. 21              R
2
=.22 , Adj. R
2
=.22                                             R
2
=.22 , Adj. R
2




=.24    
                                                                         SE=.93    F=68.84 ***
(6,1526 )           SE=.92   F=62.79***
(7,1525)                                 SE=.98   F=126.84***
(6,2725)             SE=.97   F=120.97***
(7,2724)  
                                                      b                  SE  b                   SE                      b                 SE                          b             SE  
  Constant    .83***   .06     1.32***  .12    .73***  .04    1.19***  .05 
  Low income quartile    .30***  .08   .26**  .08   .37***  .07   .04  .08 
 Low-mid  income  quartile   .19**  .07   .19**  .07   .26*** .05    .17***  .05 
 Mid-high  income  quartile     .03  .06   .04  .06   .13**  .05   .12**  .05 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .28**  .11  -  .26**  .10  -  .42***  .08  -  .40***  .08 
  Female 25 to 30 years     .71***  .07    .72***  .07    .40***  .05    .41***  .05 
  Female 30 to 40 years     1.00***  .06    1.00***  .06    1.05***  .05    1.04***  .06 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years             
 Dual-Earner  (v.  Male  Breadwinner)        -  .51***  .11        -  .47***  .06 
 
 -TABLE 4- 
OLS Country Results: Average Number of Children Under 18  
1980s v. 1990s 
***p<.000   **  p<.01   *    p<.05                06/20/01 
SWEDEN 
    
           1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1                 1990s Model 2                 
               (N=1101)                            (N=1101)                                                (N=3320)                                  (N=3320)  
                                                  R
2
=.22  , Adj. R
2
=. 21              R
2
=.23 , Adj. R
2
=.22                                              R
2
=.20 , Adj. R
2




=.21    
                                                                         SE=.96    F=50.44 ***
(6,1094 )           SE=.96   F=45.25***
(7,1093)                             SE=1.00   F=141.52***
(6,3313)               SE=1.00   F=123.13***
(7,3312)  
                                                        b                  SE  b                   SE                        b                SE                          b             SE  
  Constant    .81****  .06    1.15***  .12     .83***  .04    1.03***  .07 
 Low  income  quartile   .28**  .10   .20*  .10   .30*** .06    .26***  .06 
 Low-mid  income  quartile   .24**  .08   .19*  .08   .16**  .05   .13**  .05 
  Mid-high  income  quartile    - .04  .07  - .04  .07  - .01  .05  - .02  .05 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .56***  .11  -  .55***  .11  -  .59***  .08  -  .59***  .08 
  Female 25 to 30 years     .41***  .09    .42***  .09    .35***  .05    .36***  .05 
  Female 30 to 40 years     .92***  .07    .92***  .07    .99***  .04    1.00***  .04 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years               




           1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1                 1990s Model 2                 
               (N=2687)                            (N=2687)                                                (N=7726)                                  (N=7726)  
                                                  R
2
=.17  , Adj. R
2
=. 17              R
2
=.22 , Adj. R
2
=.22                                              R
2
=.16 , Adj. R
2




=.21    
                                                                         SE=1.06    F=93.97 ***
(6,2680 )           SE=1.03   F=106.19***
(7,2679)                             SE=1.08   F=244.78***
(6,7719)               SE=1.05   F=287.86***
(7,7718)  
                                                        b                  SE  b                   SE                        b                SE                          b             SE  
  Constant       .66***  .05    1.14***  .06    .72***  .03    1.32***  .04 
 Low  income  quartile    .70***  .06   .50***  .06   .61***  .04   .42***  .04 
 Low-mid  income  quartile    .49***  .06   .39***  .06   .36***  .03   .28***  .03 
  Mid-high income quartile       .21***  .05   .19***  .05   .19***  .03   .18***  .03 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25     -  .34***  .08  -  .35***  .08  -  .60***  .05  -  .62***  .05 
 Female  25  to  30  years      .42***  .06   .36***  .06   .11***  .03   .07  .03 
 Female  30  to  40  years      .87***  .05   .84***  .05   .79***  .03   .73***  .03 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years             
 Dual-Earner  (v.  Male  Breadwinner)        -  .55***  .05        -  .66***  .03 
 
          -TABLE 4- 
OLS Country Results: Average Number of Children Under 18  
1980s v. 1990s 
***p<.000   **  p<.01   *    p<.05                06/20/01 
UNITED STATES 
    
           1980s Model 1  1980s  Model 2                    1990s Model 1                 1990s Model 2                 
               (N=34189)                            (N=34189)                                            (N=17339)                                  (N=17339)  
                                                  R
2
=.12  , Adj. R
2
=. 12              R
2
=.15 , Adj. R
2
=.15                                              R
2
=.09 , Adj. R
2




=.12    
                                                                         SE=1.14    F=753.99 ***
(6,34183 )      SE=1.12   F=844.42***
(7,34182)                             SE=1.14   F=297.16***
(6,17333)            SE=.1.12   F=332.44***
(7,17332)  
                                                        b                SE  b                   SE                        b                SE                          b             SE  
  Constant    .76***  .02    1.17***  .02      .93**  .02    1.36***  .03 
  Low income quartile    .45*** .02    .33*** .02    .20*** .03    .06*  .03 
  Low-mid income quartile    .33*** .02    .27*** .02    .10*** .03    .06** .02 
  Mid-high income quartile     .13*** .02    .10*** .02  -  .04  .02  -  .04  .02 
     Referent:  Highest income quartile     
  Female less than 25   -  .34***  .02  -  .28***  .02  -  .17***  .04  -  .12***  .04 
  Female 25 to 30 years     .36***  .02    .39***  .02    .33***  .03    .35***  .03 
  Female 30 to 40 years     .81***  .02    .82***  .00    .78***  .02    .77***  .02 
      Referent: Female 41 to 50 years               
 Dual-Earner  (v.  Male  Breadwinner)        -  .50***  .01        -  .48***  .02 
 
 